Sandel on Religion in the Public Square by Baxter, Hugh
Boston University School of Law
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
7-2011
Sandel on Religion in the Public Square
Hugh Baxter
Boston Univeristy School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hugh Baxter, Sandel on Religion in the Public Square, 91 Boston University Law Review 1339 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/428
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2670073 
 
1339 
SANDEL ON RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 
HUGH BAXTER∗ 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1339 
 I. RAWLS AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC REASON .................................... 1339 
 II. OPEN QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE “POLITICS OF THE COMMON 
GOOD” ............................................................................................... 1342 
INTRODUCTION 
In the final chapter of Justice, Sandel calls for a “new politics of the 
common good,”1 which he presents as an alternative to John Rawls’s idea of 
public reason.  Sandel calls “misguided” Rawls’s search for “principles of 
justice that are neutral among competing conceptions of the good life.”2  
According to Sandel, “[i]t is not always possible to define our rights and duties 
without taking up substantive moral questions; and even when it’s possible it 
may not be desirable.”3  In taking up these moral questions, Sandel writes, we 
must allow specifically religious convictions and reasons into the sphere of 
public political debate.  
With these arguments, Sandel joins a debate prompted in significant part by 
Rawls’s 1993 work, Political Liberalism.  In this paper I first criticize Sandel’s 
characterization of Rawls’s views, then suggest two more particular questions 
about the role of religion that Sandel’s “new politics” needs to address. 
I. RAWLS AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC REASON 
The central premise of Rawls’s political liberalism is what he calls 
“reasonable pluralism” – that free societies are necessarily divided by 
“reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines.”4  By 
“comprehensive” doctrines, Rawls means those that “include conceptions of 
what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as 
ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much 
else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.”5 
 
∗ Professor of Law and of Philosophy, Boston University. 
1 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 263 (2009). 
2 Id. at 220. 
3 Id. 
4 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xvii (expanded ed. 2005). 
5 Id. at 13. 
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Religious conceptions are not the only examples of comprehensive doctrines, 
but they are particularly clear ones.6 
Rawls responds to reasonable pluralism by seeking what he calls a 
“freestanding” political conception: that is, a conception of justice that doesn’t 
depend upon any particular comprehensive doctrine.7  In Rawls’s metaphor, 
this freestanding political conception can fit like a “module” into the 
comprehensive doctrine of each citizen.8  In this way, Rawls argues, we can 
perhaps attain an “overlapping consensus” over a political conception of 
justice despite enduring and reasonable disagreement over comprehensive 
views.9 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls introduced the idea of “public reason” as a 
society’s rules for organizing and regulating its public political debate.10  He 
emphasized the constraints that public reason places on the kinds of arguments 
that may be offered in public debate.11  With regard to “constitutional 
essentials” and “matters of basic justice,”12 Rawls maintained in Political 
Liberalism that “political values alone” are to be invoked – that is, values from 
a freestanding political conception and not a comprehensive doctrine.13  These 
“limits of public reason” apply to “citizens when they engage in political 
advocacy in the public forum,” or to citizens when they vote on fundamental 
matters.14  They apply, further, to candidates, to “political parties,” and to any 
 
6 See, e.g., id. at 205, 224-25, 311.  As specific examples of non-religious comprehensive 
doctrines, Rawls mentions utilitarianism and the “reasonable liberalism[] of Kant.”  Id. at 
37; see also id. at 13, 135, 170-71. 
7 Id. at xxx, 10, 12, 144. 
8 E.g., id. at 12. 
9 For Rawls’s account of an “overlapping consensus,” see id. at 133-72. 
10 Id. at 213 (“Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its 
citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship.”). 
11 See id. at 213-22.  Public reason also has a positive side.  Rawls refers, for example, to 
the facilitative “guidelines and rules” of “public inquiry.”  Id. at 162. 
12 Rawls defines these as (1) principles specifying “the general structure of government 
and the political process,” including the various legislative, executive, and judicial powers, 
together with “the scope of majority rule”; and (2) “equal basic rights and liberties of 
citizenship,” e.g., “the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, 
freedom of thought and of association, as well as the protections of the rule of law.”  Id. at 
227.  From these Rawls distinguishes other “political questions” – which may be “most” 
political questions – e.g., “much [of] tax legislation and many laws regulating property,” 
environmental protection laws, and provisions for “museums and the arts.”  Id. at 214; see 
also id. at 244-45 (mentioning problems, arguably fundamental, that he has not addressed: 
duties to future generations, international law questions, health care, protection of animals 
and nature). 
13 Id. at 214.  In non-fundamental matters, the limits of public reason do not necessarily 
apply.  See, e.g., id. at 244-46.  
14 Id. at 215. 
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“other groups who support” candidates.15  Of course the limits of public reason 
apply also to officials in their conduct of public business. 
That was the conception Rawls presented in the original 1993 edition of 
Political Liberalism.  And that is the conception Sandel now attributes to 
Rawls.  As Sandel presents Rawls’s views: “In debating justice and rights, we 
should set aside our personal moral and religious convictions and argue from 
the standpoint of a ‘political conception of the person,’ independent of any 
particular loyalties, attachments, or conception of the good life.”16  And 
further: “Not only may government not endorse a particular conception of the 
good; citizens may not even introduce their moral and religious convictions 
into public debate about justice and rights.”17 
The main problem with Sandel’s characterization is that four years after 
Political Liberalism, Rawls changed his account of public reason, amending it 
to make public political discussion much more open to comprehensive 
doctrines, including specifically religious reasons.18  In his 1997 essay, The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited,19 reprinted in the later editions of Political 
Liberalism, Rawls introduced his famous “proviso”: 
[R]easonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be 
introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due 
course proper political reasons – and not reasons given solely by 
comprehensive doctrines – are presented that are sufficient to support 
whatever the comprehensive doctrines are said to support.20 
One might well think this proviso insufficiently inclusive of religious reasons 
and religious citizens.  But even so, a characterization of Rawls’s views on 
public reason should acknowledge the proviso and the shift it marks from 
Rawls’s earlier views in Political Liberalism.  I think that is true even of a 
book, like Sandel’s Justice, that addresses a wider, generally educated 
audience and not just Rawls specialists.  The differences between Rawls’s and 
Sandel’s views, while significant, are less than Sandel’s presentation would 
suggest. 
Sandel is of course aware of Rawls’s proviso; indeed his ongoing 
conversations with Rawls between the original publication of Political 
Liberalism and The Idea of Public Reason Revisited likely were one important 
 
15 Id.  They do not apply either to personal deliberation about politics or to political 
discussion within voluntary associations. 
16 SANDEL, supra note 1, at 248. 
17 Id. 
18 Sandel’s characterization also omits important details of Rawls’s views in Political 
Liberalism.  See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 247-52 (describing circumstances in which 
comprehensive views might be introduced as a sort of repair work in a society that is sharply 
divided). 
19 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997). 
20 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 462.  
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reason Rawls modified his views.21  My point is simply that the reader of 
Sandel’s book should be apprised of  Rawls’s final position on the subject. 
II. OPEN QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE “POLITICS OF THE COMMON GOOD” 
Sandel acknowledges that his idea of a new “kind of political discourse” is 
not yet “fully worked out.”22  I want to suggest a few questions he should 
address about the inclusion of religious reasons in that political discourse. 
One question is whether public officials should be subject to obligations 
more stringent than those that apply to private citizens.  Sandel doesn’t reject 
this position definitively, but he doesn’t endorse it either.  As the exemplar of 
the liberal neutrality he criticizes, Sandel selects President Kennedy’s 1960 
speech that declared his Catholic faith a purely private matter.  That faith, 
Kennedy assured the public, “would have no bearing on his public 
responsibilities.”23  Kennedy’s speech, Sandel writes critically, “reflected a 
public philosophy,” exemplified in Rawls’s 1971 Theory of Justice, “that 
government should be neutral on moral and religious questions” so as to allow 
each individual the freedom to choose “his or her own conception of the good 
life.”24  Although Sandel also acknowledges what he calls a “legitimate worry” 
about an “entanglement” of politics in “moral and religious disputes,” he 
doesn’t clearly indicate a difference between public officials’ obligations and 
those of ordinary citizens with respect to religion’s role in politics.25 
As Sandel of course knows, the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, with its prohibition on “an establishment of religion,” limits the 
degree and kind of “entanglement” between politics and religion.26  I don’t 
read Sandel’s sketch of his morally committed politics, with his praise for 
 
21 See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1776-94 
(1994) (book review) (discussing Rawls’s proviso). 
22 SANDEL, supra note 1, at 261. 
23 Id. at 244. 
24 Id. at 246. 
25 Id. 
26 Sandel’s use of the word “entanglement” may be a reference to the Lemon test, which 
the Supreme Court often has applied (or at least invoked) in Establishment Clause cases.  
Under the original formulation of the test, a challenged governmental action will be 
invalidated unless it satisfies each of the following criteria: (1) it must have a secular 
purpose; (2) its “primary effect” must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it must 
not create an “excessive government entanglement with religion.”  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).  The Court’s decision in Agostini v. Felton revised the test, 
treating entanglement not as a separate inquiry but as one of three factors to be considered in 
determining unconstitutional effect.  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997).  
Although Lemon hasn’t formally been overruled, in recent years the Court often has 
employed instead the “endorsement” test, abandoning reference to forbidden 
“entanglement.”  See id. at 235. 
  
2011] RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 1343 
 
then-candidate Obama’s invocation of religion, to threaten action inconsistent 
with the Constitution.27 
But aside from the question whether Sandel’s proposals violate the 
Constitution as judicially interpreted and enforced, one might ask also whether 
he shouldn’t acknowledge an obligation of officials, and perhaps candidates as 
well, to speak in a secular language when they seek to justify their policy 
proposals or carry out governmental decisions.  The great German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas makes just this claim, even as he rejects as too restrictive 
Rawls’s rules (proviso included) for ordinary citizens in public debate.  
Habermas writes that the liberal state must expect citizens “to recognize the 
principle that exercise of political authority must be neutral toward competing 
worldviews.  Every citizen must know and accept that only secular reasons 
count beyond the institutional threshold separating the informal public sphere 
from parliaments, courts, ministries, and administrations.”28 
As formulated, Habermas’s “institutional translation proviso,” as he calls it, 
distinguishes between religious and secular comprehensive views: only 
religious reasons must be screened out in the sphere of policy formulation and 
decision.  While Habermas has left some questions unanswered – for example, 
whether his proviso would require exclusively secular reasons of candidates as 
well as of officials – the line he draws for officials seems to me appropriate for 
a pluralist democratic society.  Sandel doesn’t endorse such a principle, but as I 
read his text he has left the matter open. 
Habermas’s institutional translation proviso would seem attractive to Sandel 
in its application to ordinary citizens.  Habermas notes the asymmetry of the 
burden that Rawls’s proviso imposes: “[Rawls’s] translation proviso for 
religious reasons and the institutional precedence of secular over religious 
reasons demand that religious citizens make an effort to learn and adapt that 
 
27 Sandel praises then-candidate Obama for understanding and speaking to “the moral 
and spiritual yearning” in America.  Obama is right, Sandel says, to counsel progressives 
not to “abandon the field of religious discourse.”  SANDEL, supra note 1, at 250 (quoting 
Barack Obama, Keynote Address at Call to Renewal Conference (June 28, 2006) 
[hereinafter Obama, Call to Renewal], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/us/ 
politics/2006obamaspeech. html).  Sandel further cites approvingly Obama’s 2006 criticism 
of a 2004 campaign remark about the role of religion in politics; in 2004 he had maintained 
that because he was running to be senator and not minister, he shouldn’t impose his own 
religious views.  SANDEL, supra note 1, at 245 (citing supra, Obama, Call to Renewal).  Two 
years later, Obama called his previous remark “the typically liberal response” and said that 
progressives should not “forfeit the imagery and terminology through which millions of 
Americans understand both their personal morality and social justice.”  Id.  Obama went on 
to note that great American reformers of the past “were not only motivated by faith, but 
repeatedly used religious language to argue for their cause.”  Id. at 246 (quoting supra, 
Obama, Call to Renewal). 
28 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the 
“Public Use of Reason” by Religious and Secular Citizens, in BETWEEN NATURALISM AND 
RELIGION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 114, 130 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2008). 
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secular citizens are spared.”29  Habermas would make the burdens on citizens 
more equal.  He rejects, as inconsistent with democratic citizenship in 
contemporary liberal societies, a “laicist” attitude that would see “religious 
traditions and religious communities” as “archaic relics of premodern societies 
persisting into the present.”30  Instead, Habermas claims that non-religious 
persons, in their capacity as participants in political discussion, must 
acknowledge that there may be “cognitive substance” in religious claims31 and 
that religious positions may be susceptible of truth.32  While the institutional 
translation proviso holds that only secular reasons may count in the 
governmental sphere of parliaments, courts, and administrations, Habermas 
argues that secular citizens must “participate in efforts to translate relevant 
contributions from the religious language into a publicly accessible 
language.”33  This obligation to cooperate in translation seems compatible with 
Sandel’s suggestion that citizens have an obligation to “attend to [their fellows’ 
moral and religious convictions] more directly – sometimes by challenging and 
contesting them, sometimes by listening to and learning from them.”34 
Perhaps less congenial to Sandel, but an alternative and in my view 
attractive way to conceive of the relation between secular and religious 
citizens, is the “accountability proviso” suggested by Cristina Lafont.35  She 
would ease the burden Rawls imposes on religious citizens, requiring neither 
that they frame their contributions to public political discourse in secular terms 
nor that they offer secular translations.36  But she criticizes Habermas’s 
requirement that secular citizens, in their capacity as participants in public 
 
29 Id. at 136. 
30 Id. at 138-39.  Habermas suggests that this unequal burden violates the neutrality 
principle of the liberal state.  This claim doesn’t seem obvious to me.  Habermas elsewhere 
invokes Rawls’s distinction between neutrality of aim and the impossible neutrality of 
effect.  See HABERMAS, Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern 
Liberalism, in BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, supra note 
28, at 271, 282-83.  Habermas needs to argue that the unequal burden on religious citizens is 
non-neutral in aim, not just in effect. 
31 HABERMAS, Religion in the Public Sphere, supra note 28, at 139 (“[T]he admission of 
religious assertions into the political arena only makes sense if all citizens can be reasonably 
expected not to exclude the possibility that these contributions may have cognitive 
substance – while at the same time respecting the priority of secular reasons and the 
institutional translation proviso.”); see also id. at 142. 
32 Id. at 131. 
33 HABERMAS, Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism, 
supra note 30, at 310; see also HABERMAS, Religion in the Public Sphere, supra note 28, at 
131-32. 
34 SANDEL, supra note 1, at 268. 
35 Cristina Lafont, Religion and the Public Sphere: What Are the Deliberative 
Obligations of Democratic Citizenship?, 35 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 127, 132 (2009). 
36 Id. at 129-32 (offering her “more attractive” theory of mutual accountability in 
contrast to Rawls’s proviso). 
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political discussion, acknowledge the possible truth of religious beliefs.37  
Religious and secular citizens, Lafont argues, should be free to take any 
“cognitive stance” that they choose.38  But in accordance with the “priority of 
public reasons in determining coercive policies,” she maintains, all citizens 
have the obligation to answer objections framed in public reasons with replies 
framed in public reasons.39  As Lafont puts her accountability proviso:  
Whenever citizens manage to cast their objections to a proposed policy in 
terms of reasons generally acceptable to democratic citizens (i.e. reasons 
based on basic democratic principles of freedom and equality, etc.), other 
citizens have the obligation to address and to defeat them with compelling 
reasons before such a coercive policy can be legitimately enforced.40 
What I am trying to suggest with this discussion of Habermas’s and Lafont’s 
revisions of the Rawlsian proviso is that there are a variety of positions 
consistent with Sandel’s general descriptions of the “politics of the common 
good.”  Habermas, Lafont, and even Rawls believe that religious citizens may 
present religious arguments in the first instance, even as to fundamental 
political matters (“constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice,” in 
Rawls’s formulation).  The interesting differences concern the further 
obligations placed on either religious or secular citizens.  Sandel’s general 
“politics of the common good” might develop with attention to these recently 
presented alternatives – whether critical or favorable – as well as to the 
question whether public officials or candidates face more stringent restrictions 
on religious convictions than do ordinary citizens. 
 
 
37 See id. at 150. 
38 Id. at 141. 
39 Id. at 141-42. 
40 Id. at 142.  Lafont makes clear that the reasons offered in reply must be “reasons 
generally acceptable to all democratic citizens,” that is, Rawlsian public reasons.  Id. at 143. 
